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Abstract
We evaluate the large scale pilot of an innovative and major welfare intervention in Colom-
bia, which combines homes visits by trained social workers to households in extreme poverty
with preferential access to social programs. We use a randomized control trial and a very rich
dataset collected as part of the evaluation to identify program impacts on the knowledge and
take-up of social programs and the labor supply of targeted households. We ﬁnd no consistent
impact of the program on these outcomes, possibly because the way the pilot was implemented
resulted in very light treatment in terms of home visits. Importantly, administrative data in-
dicates that the program has been rolled out nationally in a very similar fashion, suggesting
that this major national program is likely to fail in making a signiﬁcant contribution to re-
ducing extreme poverty. We suggest that the program should undergo substantial reforms,
which in turn should be evaluated.
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1 Introduction
Households that live in extreme poverty often face a multitude of interacting constraints that
prevent them from improving their lives (see, for example, Duﬂo, 2012). The causes of `poverty
traps' have been much debated, and yet it is not always obvious where market imperfections
and frictions arise, nor how to eﬀectively tackle them. Existing work emphasizes capital and
skill constraints as an important mechanism leading to the persistence of poverty (e.g. Banerjee
and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Ghatak and Jiang, 2002). Related literature further
highlights coordination problems (e.g. Kremer, 1993) and psychological and behavioral constraints
that arise due to poverty (e.g. Mullainathan and Shaﬁr, 2013; Dalton, Ghosal and Mani, 2014).
In order to address these issues, it is common for countries to set up a range of social programs,
usually aimed at addressing one constraint at a time. However, many of the individuals most likely
to beneﬁt are often the least likely to enroll in such programs. It has been suggested that this is
due to a lack of knowledge, stigma, over-complex programs and a lack of self-control (e.g. Currie,
2006). This paper evaluates a large-scale social program in Colombia which aims to address these
issues.
In 2007, the Colombian government launched a large-scale pilot program called Juntos, designed
to tackle extreme poverty. This program aimed to address a number of diﬀerent monetary and
non-monetary constraints to improve economic outcomes and the welfare of the poorest families
along a number of dimensions. This included improvements in health, housing, nutrition and labor
supply outcomes. The main purpose of the program was to build in indigent families the basic
capacities to sustainably manage their own development, and to stimulate demand for existing
social programs. The program attempted to achieve these goals through home visits from social
workers over a ﬁve year period, in addition to expanding and improving the supply of existing
programs in a coordinated eﬀort by federal, regional and local government agencies. It was rolled
out on a national scale in the second half of 2011 under the name of Unidos, with broadly the same
scheme and aims.1 The national program now targets 1.5 million families and accounted for 5% of
the total public budget for social inclusion in 2013.2 This program was inspired by Chile Solidario,
introduced in Chile in 2002. Programs similar in nature to Unidos have become increasingly
popular as a core strategy to alleviating poverty in a number of other Latin American countries,
including Brazil, Mexico and Peru.3 Understanding the impacts of this program is therefore of
1Since the data that we analyze pertain to the initial phase of the program, we will refer to the program as
Juntos except when speciﬁcally referring to the current program in Colombia.
2See Cuadro 31 in MENSAJE PRESIDENCIAL PROYECTO DE PRESUPUESTO GENERAL DE LA NA-
CION 2013, last accessed 20 October 2014. Note that Familias en Accion accounts for almost 40% of this budget,
serving around 2.2 million of poor families.
3Chile was the ﬁrst country to introduce this type of program in 2002, and it is called Chile Solidario. Brazil
has introduced a similar program called Brasil sem Miseria in 2011, and Mexico is implementing a variant called
Contigo Vamos Por Mas. Each program places diﬀerent emphasis on the diﬀerent components of the program:
demand side and psychosocial support versus coordination between demand and supply.
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high priority to policymakers across a number of countries.
In this paper, we examine the short-run impact of Juntos on the knowledge of a range of existing
social programs, the take-up of the main Colombian conditional cash transfer program, Familias
en Accion,4 and labor market outcomes. These labor market outcomes include the participation
rate, employment rate (and type of employment), unemployment rate, and hours worked, as well
as employment earnings and tenure. Impacts cover the initial 18-month period following the
implementation of the program across three main groups within the extreme poor in Colombia:
rural, urban and displaced households. The impact results are estimated using a large dataset
collected as part of a large randomised control trial. We observe some selection into the treatment
group as well as into the panel sample that could be potentially non-random, especially for the
urban population. We carefully document this for the three diﬀerent representative samples and
provide diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence ITT and IV estimates that aim to correct for these potential biases.
Our results suggest that Juntos had no systematic and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the outcomes of
interest. For example, focusing on rural households, we ﬁnd no impact on the knowledge of
existing social programs. We ﬁnd a positive impact on the use of Familias en Accion, relatively
large in magnitude but only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%. We ﬁnd no positive impact on
labor market outcomes. In fact we ﬁnd negative eﬀects on the probability of employment for rural
women, driven by a decrease in self-employment within this group. This is accompanied by a
decrease in the hourly pay for rural women. These results are consistent with recent empirical
evidence on conditional cash transfers, which suggests that these programs are associated with a
decrease in the labor supply of beneﬁciary individuals. This is particularly likely for women with
young children (see for example Alzua et al., 2013). However, given the large number of hypotheses
being tested simultaneously, we would expect to ﬁnd some signiﬁcant eﬀects merely by chance.
Hence, we conclude that Juntos had no impact on the outcomes of interest overall. These results
are also consistent with a preliminary evaluation analysis of Juntos on a set of restricted labor
market outcomes and other broader indicators,5 which found no impacts of the policy.
Our main hypothesis for explaining why we observe no consistent impacts of the program is that
treatment intensity was extremely low. Under the initial plans, social workers were intended to
have an average caseload of 120 households per year under the intensive treatment arm and 180
households under a non-intensive (or classic) arm, and it was expected that households receiving
the intensive treatment would experience the greatest positive eﬀects. In practice, there was no
distinction between intensive and non-intensive treatment, social workers received large caseloads,
4The take-up of other social programs is not evaluated since the proportion of households using these programs
at baseline is extremely low and there is insuﬃcient statistical power.
5A preliminary simple analysis of a restricted set of outcomes shows no consistent program impacts. This analysis
was conducted in a short time period to provide a quick assessment of the program impact on broad variables such
as employment, income, or poverty at the household level, without considering diﬀerences between genders. See
Evaluación de Impacto de Juntos (hoy Unidos). Red de Protección Social para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema
Informe de Evaluación  Diciembre de 2011 by Fedesarrollo, Econometria, SEI and IFS.
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treating an average of 180 families per year across both arms. This has potential implications for
both the quality and quantity of treatment. For example, households received an average of only
three visits over an 18 month period across both treatment arms, much lower than the intended
number of visits per year set out initially by the program plan. As a result, it is unlikely that
such treatment would have signiﬁcant eﬀects on household outcomes, even if such eﬀects may be
possible under a more intensive treatment scheme.
The home visits had two main objectives: (i) to build up the psychosocial capabilities of the extreme
poor that may be constraining their behavior, such as self-control, and (ii) to improve access to
and the use of available social programs through information provision and preferential access. It
is unlikely that the ﬁrst objective was reached within such a low number of visits. Furthermore,
administrative data suggests that the way that Juntos operated implied a high degree of variation
in the quality of home visits. In many municipalities, a set of new social workers were hired each
year to support targeted families, resulting in a lack of continuity in the relationship between the
social worker and the household. Additionally, the qualiﬁcations and experience of social workers
varied markedly.
The second objective comprises an important channel through which targeted households could
improve their economic outcomes if these social programs were targeted to their needs, and were of
suﬃcient quality. This channel could potentially be activated through the provision of information
in the initial visits. However, there does not seem to have been signiﬁcant improvements in the
knowledge about these programs or the use of these. Focus groups carried out by the initial
evaluation consortium (see footnote 4) found that targeted households did not feel that they had
preferential access. Moreover, they felt that there existed a range of barriers that prevented
access to these programs, including a mismatch between the design of these programs (along many
dimensions) and the needs of these target households. Hence, without improving the supply of
these programs, access and use will remain low.
One may think that, given the complexity of the program and the number of agencies involved,
there may have been an initial period where there were signiﬁcant issues in terms of coordination
and implementation that resulted in teething problems in setting-up and running the program, but
that these problems would dissipate over time as the program was rolled out nationally under the
name of Unidos. However, administrative data shows that the treatment in the nationally rolled
out program Unidos, despite being more intensive than in the pilot, remains very light. Social
workers in each municipality are assigned to approximately 130 households on average per year.6
This contrasts with the case of Chile Solidario, a much stronger version of this type of program,
which was targeted at a comparable population and formed the basis for the design of Juntos
and later Unidos. Treatment in Chile Solidario was more intense, with social workers assigned
50 households on average, a much smaller caseload than the average caseload in Unidos. As a
6Information provided to authors by private correspondence with ANSPE in August 2014.
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result, households received an average of 10 visits per year for a maximum period of 24 months in
Chile Solidario. In addition to this, households were guaranteed access to monetary subsidies to
compensate them for participating in the program. Carneiro et al. (2014) evaluated the eﬀects of
Chile Solidario using a quasi-experimental approach. They found a positive impact on the take-up
of a family allowance for poor children (Subsidio Unico Familiar), but found evidence of no impacts
for labor market or other economic outcomes.
Taken together with our results, this evidence has policy implications that are important not only
for Colombia, but in a wider context. Unidos is unlikely to make a signiﬁcant contribution to
the reduction of extreme poverty in Colombia. The results from the evaluation of Juntos suggest
very little impact on the economic outcomes of participants in the short term, and no impact
on the take-up of existing programs. The evidence from Chile Solidario suggests that even a
stronger version of this program is unlikely to have signiﬁcant impacts in improving the outcomes
of their target population. These households are diﬃcult to work with since they face constraints
in diﬀerent key areas such as skills, capital and psychological traits. Although recent empirical
evidence shows that some interventions are successful in alleviating such constraints in diﬀerent
developing countries, these are usually small scale interventions of high quality, often provided
by a non-government organization. A good recent example is given in Bandiera et al. (2012) on
providing skills and vocational training to adolescent girls in Uganda. Programs that are available
at a large scale are usually provided through the welfare system and there is a tradeoﬀ between
quantity and quality. First, it may be extremely diﬃcult to deliver high-quality interventions that
provides psychosocial support (either through home or group visits) of good quality at scale and
at a reasonable cost, as the evidence discussed in this paper shows. Recent experimental evidence
discussed in Attanasio et al (2014) about how to use the infrastructure of Familias en Accion
to deliver a scalable and integrated early childhood program through home visits in Colombia
may provide some positive policy lessons in this area. Second, even if the home visit component of
Unidos was eﬀective, its impact is expected to be mediated through the use of other eﬀective social
programs. Hence, the extent to which a program such as Unidos may be eﬀective will depend on
the quality of these other social programs and the extent to which they are tailored to the needs
of the extreme poor.
Having said this, it may be possible that we would observe more signiﬁcant results if the program
was improved. This would take the form of improving the quantity and quality of social workers,
including the relationship or bond between the social worker and the households, and improving
the supply of existing social programs in terms of quality and quantity. In order to investigate this
properly, a further pilot program with an experimental evaluation is required. An experimental
design could be used to determine whether improvements in the quality of social worker (e.g.
through better training and/or higher wages) and the reduction in caseload (through hiring new
workers) lead to improvements in the policy impacts. It could also test if some of the social
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programs available to the extreme poor are eﬀective at all. This would indicate whether the
program can be modiﬁed to have signiﬁcant impacts, or should be replaced in its entirety.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next Section provides background in-
formation about the program. Section 3 describes the evaluation design and issues related to the
implementation. Section 4 discusses the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows
our empirical methodology and presents the impact results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and description of the program
In 2009, the Colombian government launched Juntos, a smaller scale pilot of the Unidos program
that had been rolled out nationally by late 2011. This is a social protection program for individuals
living in extreme poverty in Colombia.7Juntos comprised the same objectives and design as the
full Unidos program, and participants faced the same eligibility criteria. Unidos is a large-scale
government intervention. It targets, and currently almost serves, 1.5 million families in extreme
poverty in all 1,102 municipalities across the 32 departments of Colombia, at an annual cost of
approximately US$ 140 millions, or 5% of the total budget to promote social inclusion.8 The
scale and the cost of the program clearly reﬂect that this program is of substantial importance in
Colombia.
The eligible population comprises two groups. First, households are eligible based on their low
overall economic well-being. In Colombia, all households are registered to one of six SISBEN levels.
SISBEN summarizes economic well-being, and is already used to identify eligible households for a
number of diﬀerent national welfare programs.9 All households registered as SISBEN level 1 are
eligible to enroll in the Unidos program, which includes roughly 20% of the poorest households.
Around 1.2 million households qualiﬁed for Unidos under this criteria.
Second, households registered in the Unique Register of Displaced Population (Registro Unico de
Poblacion Desplazada or RUPD) are eligible for participating in Unidos. Colombia is among the
countries with the highest proportion of internally displaced people in the world.10 To be registered
on the RUPD, households must prove that they have been internally displaced by providing an
oral account of the facts to a public oﬃce. This population is considered to be largely marginalized
7See the oﬃcial website for more details:
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloSocial/Pol%C3%ADticasSocialesTransversales/
RedUnidosparaSuperaci%C3%B3ndelaPobrezaExtrema.aspx, last accessed on 26 February 2014.
8Information provided to authors by ANSPE by correspondence in August 2014, in turn sourced from Reporte
CIIF - MINHACIENDA y Oﬁcina Asesora de Planeación. Reporte CIIF - MINHACIENDA y Oﬁcina Asesora de
Planeación.
9For more information, see www.sisben.gov.co
10The UN Refugee Agency, see for example http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html, last accessed 11
November 2014.
6
from society, and the program aims to facilitate their use of existing social security programs.11
Eligibility for displaced families is irrespective of their SISBEN classiﬁcation, with many of these
households classiﬁed in higher levels.12 There are 300,000 such households targeted by the program.
These are the same criteria used for Familias en Accion,13 a conditional cash transfer program
targeted at poor households with children, and which positive impacts have been widely reported.14
As a result, a signiﬁcant proportion of households targeted by Unidos are already registered in
Familias en Accion.
The program employs a two-arm strategy to lift the most impoverished members of society out of
poverty. The ﬁrst arm aims to improve household skills and to increase their demand for social
programs through home visits and providing information about the programs, while the second
strengthens the supply of existing social programs. The ﬁrst arm is delivered through home visits
and has two speciﬁc objectives:
1. Improving knowledge of, and access to, social welfare programs. The ﬁrst objective
is to improve the knowledge of existing social welfare programs, and to improve access to
these programs by removing the constraints that prevent the poorest families from becoming
recipients. For example, social workers can provide assistance in completing sometimes
complex and confusing application processes for enrolling in existing programs.
2. Helping families to manage their own development. The second objective is to pro-
vide a sustainable long-term escape from poverty through helping families to manage their
own development by focusing in speciﬁc strategic areas. This is expected to be achieved via
the home visits, by social workers (cogestores social) working with each of the families to
identify areas of vulnerability and to develop bespoke strategies or action plans, ﬁtted to the
unique circumstances of each family and taking into account their own capabilities, in order
to address the identiﬁed issues and identify social programs that can help them to overcome
these challenges. These strategies focus on nine dimensions important for sustainable de-
velopment: i) personal identiﬁcation cards; ii) income and jobs; iii) education and training;
iv) health; v) nutrition; vi) housing; vii) family dynamics; viii) banking and savings; and ix)
access to justice.15
11See Unidad para La Atencion y Reparacion Integral a las Victimas (Junio 2013).
12See point 2.4 Manual Operativo InfoJuntos 2009.
13As of June 2012, the law governing Familias en Accion additionally includes indigenous families.
http://www.dps.gov.co/documentos/FA/LEY-FAMILIAS-ACCION.pdf
14Familias en Accion is a country-wide conditional cash transfer program reaching 2.6 million families. It is aimed
at encouraging beneﬁcial health and education related behavior amongst deprived and/or displaced families with
at least one child under the age of 18. There is a vast number of papers that report the impact of this program. For
example, Attanasio, Fitzsimons and Gomez (2005) report a positive impact on school enrollment and time spent in
school. Baez, Camacho and Nguyen (2011) provide a useful and broad review of the evidence.
15Our study focuses on the second dimension: income and jobs, since this is the one that if improved is more likely
to get the households out of poverty in a sustainable way. Furthermore, the preliminary analysis on the impact
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Social workers play an important role in achieving these objectives. The program is designed in
theory to provide an intensive period of social support to households through home visits by social
workers. These visits occur for up to ﬁve years, with the frequency of visits decreasing over time.
These visits are divided into two stages. First, in the initial visits, the social worker works with the
household to identify weaknesses and issues which they need to address in order to escape poverty.
This is achieved through the completion of the Family Baseline (Linea de Base or LB) questionnaire,
which provides an assessment of 45 indicators (or logros). Second, households identify the actions
which they need to take in order to achieve their objectives and with the help of the social worker,
the household devise a `family plan' that sets out the main priorities and how to address them.
Follow-up visits are then provided to the family, according to its needs and to check on progress
towards their objectives. Households `graduate' from Unidos if they achieve all of their objectives
within ﬁve years of enrolling in the program. According to the Agencia Nacional de Superación de
Pobreza Extrema (ANSPE) around 16% of the beneﬁciaries families have graduated from Unidos
as of August 2014.16
The second arm of the program aims to improve the access to existing social programs for those
who are eligible from the supply side. This is achieved in two ways. First, the program provides
Unidos-eligible families with preferential access to existing social programs. This ensures that
households can access these programs. Second, it aims to strengthen these programs by providing
improved support for the agencies which manage the provision of welfare beneﬁts. This is done
to ensure that suﬃcient supply of social welfare programs is available for any eligible households
who want to enroll and that these programs meet the needs of the targeted population. The
combination of the two program arms should therefore serve the dual objectives of increasing the
demand for social welfare programs among the poorest households, while simultaneously ensuring
that suﬃcient supply of these services is available to meet any increased demand.
3 The evaluation of Juntos
3.1 Evaluation design
The Juntos pilot program and its evaluation design were initial components of the wider Unidos
program. The evaluation was planned in collaboration with ANSPE, the government implementing
agency. This evaluation took place in 77 municipalities, which were selected to provide a represen-
tative sample of all municipalities in Colombia.17 As a result, our estimates should be interpreted
of Juntos performed by the Evaluation consortium (see source in footnote 5) showed no impact on any outcomes
associated with the other dimensions.
16Idem footnote 7.
17The consortium, consisting of Econometria, the IFS, Fedesarrollo and S.E.I., who conducted the initial program
design and evaluation, found that the selected municipalities did not diﬀer in their observable characteristics from
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as externally valid with respect to the impacts of the program across Colombia.
The evaluation employed an experimental design to ensure that individuals in treatment and con-
trol groups were comparable along observable and unobservable dimensions. Random assignment
to treatment and control groups followed a structured process. First, the population of eligible
families within participating municipalities were identiﬁed in early 2008. Second, each participat-
ing municipality was divided into several neighborhoods, or `barrios'. Third, between September
2008 and April 2009, each neighborhood was randomly assigned to one of four groups or cohorts.
The program was rolled out to cohorts sequentially, so that the treatment began at diﬀerent times
across diﬀerent neighborhoods. Given random assignment to cohorts, prior to the roll-out of the
program the characteristics of households across neighborhoods should be identical on average.
This provides us with an opportunity to use neighborhoods in the fourth cohort as a control group
for neighborhoods in the ﬁrst cohort.
Due to the fact that the intensity of treatment was heterogeneous within the treatment group, the
evaluation was in theory designed to allow for a more detailed analysis of treatment impacts. More
speciﬁcally, it permitted testing of whether the impacts of the treatment varied by the intensity,
or the number of home visits, received by the household. This was achieved by further dividing
the treatment group into `classic' and `intensive' treatment groups. This process was conducted in
the following way. First, social workers were recruited and randomly allocated to neighborhoods.
Second, these social workers were randomly assigned to providing classic or intensive treatment.
This process meant that household allocation into the two treatment arms was also random. Social
workers who provided intensive treatment were, in theory, assigned fewer cases. This lower caseload
would allow a greater focus on each household and enable the social workers to provide a greater
number of visits to each household. This was not implemented in practice, as we discuss in the
next section.
This design was intended to produce three distinct groups of interest: the control group (fourth
cohort), the classic treatment group (ﬁrst cohort), and the intensive treatment group (ﬁrst cohort).
Given random assignment, the characteristics of households across groups should be identical in
the absence of the program. The impact of each treatment type can therefore be estimated by
comparing mean outcomes between each treatment group and the control group in the post-
program period. The evaluation design also separately identiﬁed three sub-populations of interest:
rural, urban and displaced. Even within the population of the extreme poor, the impacts of the
program are likely to be highly heterogeneous across the three populations.18 All subsequent
analysis will therefore examine each population separately.
excluded municipalities. See Evaluación de Impacto de Juntos (hoy Unidos) . Red de Protección Social para la
Superación de la Pobreza Extrema Informe de Evaluación  Diciembre de 2011 by Fedesarrollo, Econometria, SEI
and IFS.
18Most of the displaced households live in urban areas (around 95% of the displaced households in our sample),
so their behavior is likely to be most similar to urban households in a number of ways.
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In this paper, we evaluate the short-run impact of Juntos over the period between 2009 and mid-
2011. The collection of baseline data occurred between November 2009 and March 2010. This
period was prior to the initial treatment of all cohorts. Follow-up data was collected between June
and August 2011, prior to the roll out of the program in neighborhoods assigned to cohort four.
During the period between survey waves, households assigned to cohort one should have received
home visits from social workers, while cohort four households should have received no visits. The
evaluation ﬁnished in December 2011, and treatment had (in theory) subsequently been rolled out
to all eligible households across the country.
3.2 Evaluation and program implementation
Large scale evaluations often face a number of challenges in their design and implementation. In
this case we need to consider two main issues when estimating the casual eﬀect of the program.
First, there is some contamination between the treatment and control groups. More broadly, a low
number of visits are reported by all groups at follow up. This suggests that treatment was only
weakly implemented for the majority of participants. Second, households in the intensive treatment
group did not systematically receive a higher number of visits than those in the classic treatment.
We use two measures of the number of social worker home visits received by households in each
wave to investigate these issues. These measures are: (i) the oﬃcial number of visits recorded
by the social workers, and (ii) the number of visits which the household report in the household
questionnaire (perceived visits).19
Figure 1 shows the number of oﬃcial home visits made to households at baseline and follow up, and
distinguishes between households assigned to the treatment and control groups. Figure 2 displays
the same information for self-reported or perceived home visits. As exaplained in section 2, social
workers provide support to families through home visits, and these visits are organised in principle
in sessions according to speciﬁc tasks. The social worker and the family co-produce the Family
Baseline (ﬁrst session of the home visits) and Family Plan (second session of the home visits) and
each session is expected to comprise two visits to the household. The number of sessions, and their
associated number of visits, needed to implement the Family Plan20 is expected to vary across
households according to their needs.21 Together, these ﬁgures present three main points.
First, there is a large discrepancy between the number of oﬃcial and perceived visits. The initial
evaluation suggested that some respondents may have mistaken the evaluation interviewer or public
oﬃcials for social workers, and therefore report a higher number of visits than they received from
19We describe the surveys and questionnaires in more detail in the next section.
20The implementation of the Family Plan involves mainly linking the families to the speciﬁc social programs
that are tailored to their identiﬁed needs and strategic priorities organised around the nine dimensions discussed in
Section 2.
21This information has been taken from the Operative Manual of Juntos, version 24/03/2009, Section 4.1.4. Fases
del Acompanamento Familiar.
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the social worker. Anectodal evidence also suggests that some social workers may have visited
some households informally more frequently. Unfortunately, there is no information about social
workers' characteristics that could shed light on potential variation in the quality of social workers
and the quality of the visits in terms of their duration.
Second, treatment was either weak, or not administered at all, for many members of the treatment
group. Figure 1 suggests that 25% of the treatment group had received no visits at follow-up,
while an additional 20% received only one or two visits. Figure 2 shows a similar pattern in self-
reported visits. This low intensity of treatment is unlikely to have produced signiﬁcant changes in
the outcomes of households over the period (even if a more intense version of the treatment would
do so).
Finally, 70% of households in the control group report at least one visit at follow up. This is
in contrast to the oﬃcial data, which record no visits to households in the control group. This
suggests that households in the control group were visited (perhaps informally) by a social worker;
or as mentioned above that they mistook an oﬃcial or interviewer for a social worker.
Taken together, these ﬁgures suggest that some control group households received visits during
the pilot phase. Meanwhile, many households who were assigned to the treatment group received
no, or only weak, treatment. As a result, randomly assigned treatment status may not accurately
represent the actual treatment received.
Tables 1 and 2 show the average number of home visits at baseline and follow-up by treatment
group, using oﬃcial and self-reported visits respectively. These statistics are presented separately
for each population type. They suggest that households in the intensive and classic treatment
groups did not receive a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent number of (perceived or oﬃcial) home visits at
follow-up. Both treatment groups had on average approximately 1.8 oﬃcial visits at follow-up,
regardless of population type. The numbers of perceived visits were higher for all groups. Classic
treatment households report a higher number of visits at follow-up on average as compared to
intensive treatment households, but the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant.
These ﬁndings have two implications for our analysis. First, the absence of diﬀerences in the
number of home visits between the classic and intensive treatment groups suggests that the analysis
should ignore the distinction between the groups. We therefore group all treated households
together in the remainder of this paper.
Second, the issues of contamination means that in addition to intention to treat (ITT) estimates,
we also obtain estimates using an instrumental variables approach. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne two
treatment dummy variables. The ﬁrst one is based on the assigned treatment (call this variable
'T'), which gives the ITT estimates. This variable 'T takes the value of one if a household was
originally allocated to intensive or classic treatment and zero otherwise, regardless of the number
of oﬃcial or perceived visits they actually received. The second one is based on self-reported or
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perceived visits by a Juntos social worker (call this variable 'TR') at the time of the follow-up
data collection, which we consider the real treatment. This is because it seems likely that only
households that perceive visits from a social worker will be aﬀected by the program, by changing
their knowledge and behavior in terms of their use of the available programs and overcoming their
extreme poverty condition. The variable 'TR' takes the value of one if a household self-reported
to have received three home visits prior to the follow-up and zero otherwise. Hence, households
that self-reported less than three visits at the time of follow-up are the controls. We instrument
this 'real' treatment variable 'TR' using the variable 'T' that reﬂects initial random allocation to
treatment. We discuss the assumption underlying this empirical strategy in more detail in Section
5.22
Table 3 cross tabulates our real treatment 'TR' (according to perceived visits) and randomly
assigned treatment 'T' variables, and summarizes the issue of contamination and imperfect com-
pliance for the whole sample. As we explain in the next section, in our analysis we use a selected
sample of households and individual members of these households, for which we observe a range
of variables of interest in both periods, and the patterns observed in Figures 1 and 2 and Tables
1 to 3 are very similar.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data collection and sample selection
A rich set of data was collected as part of the evaluation. Data were collected in two separate
waves. Initial data collection took place between November 2009 and March 2010, prior to the
implementation of the Juntos pilot in cohort one neighborhoods (baseline). A second wave of
data was collected between June and August 2011 (follow-up). The data contains a rich set
of information, including socio-demographic characteristics at both the household and individual
level, and individual labor market experiences. In addition, the follow-up data contain information
on the knowledge and usage of existing social welfare programs.
These data allow us to focus our analysis on three type of outcomes of particular importance
given the aims of the program. These are 1) the knowledge of a range of existing social programs,
2) the take-up of the main Colombian conditional cash transfer program, Familias en Accion,
and 3) labor market outcomes, in particular participation rate, employment rate (and type of
employment), unemployment rate, and hours worked as well as employment earnings and tenure.
22Note that our results are robust to a number of deﬁnitions. Results are robust if oﬃcial number of visits are
used instead. Results change little if treatment is deﬁned as two visits or four visits. Results are available upon
request.
12
Given the scale of the evaluation, it was not feasible to sample the entire population of participants
for the study. We use a random sample of participants collected across each of the municipalities.
These samples were stratiﬁed by population type (urban, rural and displaced) and the type of
treatment (control, classic and intensive treatment). The sample size for each population was
determined prior to data collection by power analysis. In addition, questionnaires of diﬀerent
lengths were administered to diﬀerent households. Three types of questionnaire were administered
(short, medium and long) within cells deﬁned by population type and the survey wave. These
assignments were made according to power calculations speciﬁc to each outcome of interest.23
As a consequence, information is available for speciﬁc variables of interest for a subsample of
households in both waves of the data. This means that we focus on the sample of households and
individual members who provided a full set of information for all our variables of interest, at both
baseline and follow-up.
Program knowledge and usage information is contained only at follow-up in all cases. A total
of 5,872 households were surveyed at baseline but we cannot use all of them in our analysis.
Some households drop from the original sample due to classical attrition. Additional households
were added at follow-up to increase sample size, increasing the sample to 8,091. When we focus
attention to households providing information in both waves, we have a balanced panel of 5,166
households.24 We further restrict our sample of interest to households with an adult head of
household (aged 18 years or older), who provided a full set of answers to questions relating to
labor market outcomes. This yields a ﬁnal sample of 2,446 households. Our analysis also includes
individual labor supply outcomes for individuals aged between 18 and 60 years old. The ﬁnal
sample includes 5,042 individuals who fulﬁll these criteria.
To summarize, selection of households and individuals into our sample may arise from three chan-
nels:
1. Classical household attrition - households appear at baseline but are not included in the
follow-up sample.
2. Individual attrition - individuals appear at baseline but are not surveyed at follow-up. This
may occur even if other members of their household remain in the sample.25
3. Questionnaire-type attrition - in principle, households were assigned to diﬀerent questionnaire
types at random.
23The use of diﬀerent questionnaires was due to a limited budget for data collection. For more details of this
process, see the evaluation report cited in footnote 5.
2413% of the initial sample did not appear in the follow-up survey. This is in line with the average attrition rates
in large RCTs.
25Individuals may have left the household between waves. In addition, some individuals did not have consistent
identiﬁers across the two periods. We match these individuals across waves using name and gender. We managed
to successfully match 82% of all individuals that appear in households in the panel.
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One potential implication of the sample restrictions is that selection into treatment and control
group is no longer random. We assess whether selection into the ﬁnal sample was systematically
related to treatment status in the following way. First, we take all the sample at baseline and
create a binary variable that takes the value of one if a household (or an individual) is in the ﬁnal
sample selected, and zero otherwise. Second, we regress the probability of appearing in the ﬁnal
sample on an indicator of whether the household was originally assigned to treatment, which is
available to all households and individuals at baseline as opposed to other key variables for our
analysis. We run a second regression that includes some baseline characteristics that are available
for all observations, and interacts these characteristics with an indicator of assigned treatment
status. This tests whether the interaction of assigned treatment and baseline characteristics are
systematically associated with appearing in the ﬁnal sample among all households present at
baseline. If this association is signiﬁcant, the impact estimates obtains from the sample could
be biased. For example if the households who were initially assigned to random treatment only
remain in the sample if they have greater income than the households who leave the sample, we
would overestimate the impact of the treatment on incomes. This analysis is conducted for each
of the three populations to examine selection issues in each sample. We conduct a similar analysis
at the individual level, by gender, and by population type.
Table 4 shows the relationship between assignment to treatment and the likelihood of a household
appearing in the ﬁnal sample using the sample of almost 6,000 households at baseline (note that
only 2,446 households end up in our ﬁnal sample). Results are displayed separately for each
population type. The table provides two main insights. First, columns 1, 3 and 5 show that
treatment status does not predict selection into the ﬁnal sample across the three samples. However,
columns 2, 4 and 6 show a slightly diﬀerent picture. The F-test, which tests the joint signiﬁcance
of all interactions between household baseline characteristics and assigned treatment status, is
signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels for the urban and displaced populations respectively. This
suggests that selection into the ﬁnal sample appears to be non-random for the urban and, to a
lesser extent, the displaced population. In contrast, the results indicate that selection into the
ﬁnal rural sample is random.
Table 5 conducts a similar analysis at the individual level, considering over 14,000 individuals that
appear at baseline, and shows the relationship between assigned treatment and the likelihood of an
individual appearing in the ﬁnal sample of 5,042 individuals, by gender and population type. The
results are similar to the household analysis, and indicate that the samples of male and female rural
individuals are randomly selected. In addition, the male urban sample appears to be randomly
selected. The urban female and displaced individual samples remain non-randomly selected.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the estimates of the program eﬀects for the urban
and displaced populations should be interpreted with some caution. To address this issue, we
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estimate regressions using ﬁrst diﬀerences when data are available at baseline.26 This accounts
for permanent diﬀerences across individuals which could inﬂuence selection into the sample. This
would reduce potential bias arising from the non-random selection into the sample for aﬀected
samples. We discuss our empirical strategy in more detail in Section 5.
4.2 Pre- and Post-Treatment Characteristics
In this section we present descriptive statistics on pre-treatment and post-treatment income gen-
erating activities of household heads and their key socio-demographic characteristics for our panel
of households. In addition, we document the knowledge and use of public programs. We do
not distinguish between the randomly assigned treatment groups. The following section explores
diﬀerences across participants in this dimension.
It is important to note that we report unconditional means throughout this section. This means
that statistics relating to employment, earnings, tenure, and hours all include zeros for those not
active or unemployed. Hence, for example, observed changes in average earnings over time may
be a result of a genuine increase in earnings for individuals who are employed, or an increase in
the proportion of people who are in employment, and hence reporting any positive earnings.27
Socio-demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes of head of households
Table 6 shows the mean socio-demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes for our panel
of households both at baseline and follow-up by population type. Labor market outcomes refer
to the head of households in the panel sample. The table presents two interesting, and broadly
positive patterns in the labor market outcomes of these households. First, labor market partic-
ipation remained relatively stable across the period. This is true for all three populations, with
approximately 70% of household heads recorded as economically active.28 However, the compo-
sition of activity changed substantially over the period. Employment rates of household heads
increased signiﬁcantly within each population type, while unemployment fell substantially. For
example, 52% of displaced household heads were employed in the baseline. This had increased to
65% for the same sample of households by the follow-up, an increase of 25%. Much of this growth
in employment was driven by increases in self-employment. We also observe similar patterns for
the other populations. The striking increase in employment rates and decrease in unemployment
rates could be related to seasonality, or could be related to a sustained improvement in the labor
outcomes of the extreme poor. One thing that we know is that these changes are not a consequence
of the introduction of the Juntos program, since we ﬁnd no systematic and signiﬁcant diﬀerence
26This is the case when examining labor market outcomes. Data on social program knowledge and use are
unavailable at baseline, necessitating the comparison of levels at follow-up only.
27Appendix A includes a detailed description of how the various variables were constructed.
28See Appendix A for the exact deﬁnition of active used.
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between treatment and control heads of households as discussed in Section 5. A further investi-
gation of the factors driving theses changes is an important and interesting question for future
research.
Second, wage and salary earnings, and self-employment earnings of household heads increased
over the same period. For example, in the displaced sample, the average head of household's wage
and salary earnings at baseline was Colombian $96,710 per month (approximately US$ 50). This
increased by 13% to Colombian $109,414 at follow-up. Even greater rises are observed in the other
populations, with incomes rising by 31% and 38% for urban and rural households respectively. Self-
employment earnings increase proportionally more over time across the three populations, although
the levels are lower than wage and salary earnings at baseline. These increases in employment
income are largely driven by increases in the employment rate of the head of household.29 Tenure
also increased over the period, suggesting that employment was more sustainable.
Table 6 also reveals large diﬀerences in the socio-demographic characteristics of households across
the three population types. These diﬀerences persist throughout the period. Displaced households
have, on average, younger head of households (45 years old at follow-up) relative to urban (52) or
rural households (55). These head of households are also more likely to be female and more likely
to be the main respondent in the survey, less likely to be in a relationship, and have a higher level
of education. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the size of households across population type,
although displaced households tend to be younger.
In the ﬁnal row, we present a municipality level composite index that reﬂects the quality of public
service delivery in each municipality. This increases over time, and is relatively higher for displaced
households. This indicates that displaced households are typically located in areas with a higher
quality of public services. In contrast, rural households live in areas where the quality is lower.
Taken together, these characteristics suggest that displaced households generally live in better
overall economic conditions than households in the other populations. It is important to again note
that displaced households are eligible for enrollment in the program, regardless of their SISBEN
rating. Evidence of such a pattern is therefore not surprising.
Knowledge, use and supply of public programs Table 7 presents the self-reported knowl-
edge and usage of a selected group of public programs. These aim to provide support to individuals
or households in order to foster income generating activities. This features programs that provide
29However, it is important to note that despite these large increases in earnings, the monthly employment-
conditional earnings or wages of these households' members remain below the minimum monthly wage, as expected
for extreme poor households registered as SISBEN level 1. For example, take the individuals showing the highest
employment-conditional earnings in our samples: male employees. Their average earnings conditional on employ-
ment were Colombian $393,616 (or approximately U$S198), $384,617 (US$193), and $261,732 (US$132) at follow-up
for the displaced, urban and rural samples respectively. The minimum monthly wage stood at Colombian $535,600
(or approximately US$269) per month in 2011.
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access to credit for micro enterprises, credits for education and subsidized training activities. The
table also includes the important program of Familias en Accion. As mentioned in the precious
section, Familias en Accion was launched in 2002, and is an established conditional cash transfer
program aimed at improving the health and education outcomes of children in poor households.
The table shows the proportion of households who live in municipalities in which each program
is active.30 We do not condition on the availability of services in the municipality, and so do not
directly account for diﬀerences in the local supply of programs. It is therefore important to note
that there is signiﬁcant variation across populations, and across speciﬁc programs, in the availabil-
ity of these programs. Some programs are available in all municipalities. This includes Familias en
Accion, Jovenes Rurales Emprendedores (fosters income generating activities in rural areas),31 Red
Banca de las Oportunidades (provides access to formal microcredit, saving groups and ﬁnancial
education for deprived households and individuals, as well as micro and small enterprises),32 and
Programa para el Desarrollo de las Oportunidades de Inversion y Capitalizacion (fosters income
generating activities of poor rural households).33 Other programs are unavailable to some house-
holds in our sample. For example, Jovenes en Accion, which aims to provide vocational training for
disadvantaged youth, is not available in all municipalities. This was available to 65% of displaced
households, but only 20% of rural households.
The table also shows that knowledge and use of the majority of the programs is very low. With the
exception of Familias en Accion, the proportion of households who have knowledge of these pro-
grams ranges from 0 to 0.15. Furthermore, use is extremely low, and in most cases is close to zero.
Even programs speciﬁcally targeted towards the rural population are unknown and infrequently
used by rural households in our sample.34
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that knowledge and use of existing social programs is low among
sample households. This highlights the importance of the objective of trying to promote and
improve access to these programs for this population. However, it is concerning that knowledge
and use is so low, particularly given that these statistics are reported after the intervention was
launched.
30This information was provided by the RUAF system administered by the Colombian Ministry of Social Protec-
tion.
31See http://www.sena.edu.co/oportunidades/emprendimiento-y-empresarismo/Jovenes%20Rurales%20Emprendedores/Paginas/Jovenes-
Rurales-Emprendedores.aspx for more information.
32See http://www.bancadelasoportunidades.com/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=298&conID=673 for more in-
formation.
33See https://www.minagricultura.gov.co/tramites-servicios/desarrollo-rural/Paginas/Programa-desarrollo-
de-las-oportunidades-de-inversi%C3%B3n-y-capitalizaci%C3%B3n-de-los-activos-de-las-microempresas-rurales-
V2.aspx for more information.
34Carneiro et al. (2014) report similar ﬁndings for the Chilean population enrolled in the Chile Solidario program.
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4.3 Baseline Comparisons of Treatment and Control
The availability of baseline data allows us to test whether the randomly assigned treatment and
control samples were balanced before the program started. If randomization was successful, base-
line characteristics of those assigned to the treatment group (cohort one) will not diﬀer in a
statistically signiﬁcant way from those assigned to the control group (cohort four). We test for
balance in each household sample, based on household and head of household characteristics. We
also test for balance in each individual sample for both genders.
4.3.1 Household samples
Table 8 compares the baseline means of the assigned treatment and assigned control group of
an array of household demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes, for each of the
three populations. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the baseline means of control sample households
for displaced, urban and rural households, respectively. Columns 2, 4 and 6 report the estimated
diﬀerence between treatment and control households.
Overall, the results suggest that the three samples are highly balanced. When we conduct a
test of joint signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in all baseline characteristics, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the characteristics of households in the treatment and control groups are the same
in the urban and rural samples. The F-statistics (p-values) are 1.29 (0.214) and 0.93 (0.529) for
urban and rural respectively. This is consistent with very few individual statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in certain characteristics when examined separately. The displaced sample is marginally
unbalanced due to some imbalances in a number of household head characteristics and the age of
the household members. This translates into an F-statistic (p-value) of 1.556 (0.095). However,
labor market outcomes seem balanced in this sample.
4.3.2 Individual samples
Table 9 presents the results of conducting a test of joint signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in all baseline
characteristics between individuals assigned to the treatment and cohort groups for displaced,
urban and rural individuals respectively. We present results separately for males and females. 35
The ﬁrst row of ﬁrst two columns shows that the sample of displaced female individuals is not
balanced. In particular, female individuals in the treatment group were more likely to be econom-
ically active and to be a formal wage-earner (not displayed in the table). The F-statistic (p-value)
for this sample is 2.012 (0.02). However, the sample of displaced male individuals (second row,
ﬁrst two columns of Table 9appears to be balanced with an F-statistic (p-value) of 0.816 (0.67).
35The coeﬃcients for each individual characteristic for each sample are available to readers upon request, in some
instance we comment in the text on individual variables if these are driving some of the imabalances.
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Columns 3 and 4 of the same table show that the sample of both males and females was not
balanced at baseline for urban individuals. For females, this is driven by the fact that females
in the treatment group were more likely to be formal wage-earners, lived in smaller households,
and earn higher wages than their control group counterparts. This results in an F-statistic (p-
value) of 1.758 (0.04). Similarly, urban males in the treated sample lived in smaller households
(with fewer children), although the labor market variables were not statistically diﬀerent when
tested separately. However, when tested jointly, the male individual characteristics of treatment
group participants were statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to males in the control group, with an
F-statistic (p-value) of 2.036 (0.01).
In contrast, columns 5 and 6 suggest that the individual samples of rural females and males were
balanced. Despite some diﬀerences in characteristics when tested separately, we cannot reject that
the characteristics of females and males in the treatment and controls groups are the same when
testing all variables jointly. The F-statistics (p-values) are 0.961 (0.51) and 0.723 (0.77) for females
and males respectively.
Together, the results suggest that only a subset of the individual samples are balanced: the rural
samples and the displaced sample of males. The individual samples are largely unbalanced for the
displaced female individuals and both urban samples, driven to some extent by a few labor market
outcomes. It should be noted that that the initial random assignment was made at the household
level, and therefore the ﬁndings that some sample imbalances occur at the individual level are
perhaps unsurprising. Many of the outcomes that we examine are at the household level, for which
the samples appear to be balanced for all populations. Nevertheless, these results suggest that we
should exercise some caution when interpreting the estimates of program impacts speciﬁcally on
displaced and urban individuals.
5 Estimating Program Eﬀects
Usually, under a randomized control trial, with no contamination between the assigned treatment36
(T = 1) and control (T = 0) groups, it is straight-forward to identify the average treatment eﬀect
of a program by taking the diﬀerence in the empirical means of the outcome of interest between the
two groups. Since the evaluation under consideration has random assignment to treatment, this is
the general approach that we adopt here in order to estimate the eﬀects of the program. However,
in order to control for the potential inﬂuence of (i) contamination of the treatment and control
group (i.e. selection into the treatment group); and (ii) selection on observables and unobservables
into our sample, we use the baseline information in our panel to augment this basic approach and
ensure that our estimates are more robust. The precise approach we take to doing this is discussed
in detail below.
36Let T = 1 for those who were randomly assigned to treatment, 0 otherwise.
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Deﬁne yi to be an outcome of interest for an individual (or a household) i. We can now write the
expected average treatment eﬀect (D) of Juntos on outcome y for the extremely poor households
that received the treatment as: D = E[yi|T = 1] − E[yi|T = 0]. As mentioned above, since
households were randomly assigned to treatment and denoting the sample average Eˆ , we could
obtain the average treatment eﬀect by comparing the empirical means of the treatment and control
group:37
Dˆ = Eˆ[yi|T = 1]− Eˆ[yi|T = 0] (1)
However, as documented in Section 3, there is substantial contamination between the randomly
assigned treatment and control groups, and therefore, in the context of the Juntos evaluation
under consideration, expression (1) reﬂects the intention to treat estimate (ITT) as opposed to the
average treatment eﬀect (ATE). In order to account for the fact that the evaluation design used
cluster randomization, we can rewrite (1) in terms of a linear regression, where the cluster is a
barrio or neighborhood denoted by j.38 This speciﬁcation assumes that vj and uij are i.i.d.with
constant variance:
yij = α + βT + vj + uij (2)
It can be easily shown that under the stated assumptions, the estimated β reﬂects the impact of
Juntos on the outcome of interest, yij - i.e. βˆOLS = Eˆ[yij|T = 1]−Eˆ[yij|T = 0]. While speciﬁcation
(2) is suﬃcient for the estimation of the eﬀects of the Juntos program in theory, we take advantage
of having panel data in order to increase the precision of our results and to ensure that they are
robust. The approach we take to doing this is to augment speciﬁcation (2) in three ways.
First, in order to improve the precision of the estimates and control for any remaining baseline
imbalances, which are important for urban individuals and displaced female individuals, we control
for baseline (pre-treatment) relevant characteristics Xik (at the individual and municipality level,
municipality denoted by k). Doing this yields the following speciﬁcation:
yijk = α + βT +Xikγ + v˜j + u˜ijk (3)
Second, as mentioned above βˆOLS in speciﬁcation (3) will estimate the ITT estimate, but not the
eﬀect of the actual treatment on those that actually received visits by Juntos social workers. As
described in Section 3, we deﬁne a variable that we call real treatment (TR) that takes the value 1
if households received at least three (perceived) visits by the time of the followup data collection.
37See, for example, Duﬂo et al (2007) for an accessible review of impact evaluation methodologies.
38Unfortunately, the survey data did not contain consistent identiﬁers of these neighborhoods. This variable is
important for robust inference in the context of clustered samples. Given this, we take a conservative approach
and aggregate neighborhoods in bigger clusters deﬁned by the three original diﬀerent treatment (control, classic
treatment and intensive treatment) within each municipality. See, for instance, Pepper (2002) for a discussion of
considering a more aggregate level of clusters in cluster samples. This gives a smaller number of clusters, hence
decreasing the power of the analysis. However, as a robustness check we calculate our impact results without
clustering the standard errors and the main results are consistent.
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In order to estimate the eﬀect of Juntos on those that actually received treatment, we need to
use an instrumental variable approach. Therefore, we adopt the standard approach of using the
`assigned treatment' variable (T ) as an instrument for actual treatment (TR). By virtue of the
fact that `assignment to treatment' was randomized, it should satisfy the standard independence
and relevance assumptions:
yijk|TR ⊥ T |X (4)
cov(TR, T ) 6= 0 (5)
Importantly, in addition to the relevance assumption, we also need the stronger assumption of
monotonicity, that is the instrument makes every household either weakly more or less likely to ac-
tually participate in the Juntos program, which in this case is a reasonable assumption. It is clear
that assignment to treatment should increase an individual's propensity to acquire treatment, and
randomization should ensure that the exclusion restriction is satisﬁed, with assignment to treat-
ment exerting no inﬂuence on the outcome variable, except through treatment itself. This provides
identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect in the presence of contamination between the treatment and
control groups:
βIV =
E[yijk|Ti = 1]− E[yijk|Ti = 0]
P (TRi = 1|Ti = 1)− P (TRi = 1|Ti = 0) (6)
Under the stated assumptions, this parameter is a measure of the average impact of the Juntos
program on a particular outcome, yi, for households (or individuals) in the sample that received
the treatment (or the compliers) as a result of the random assignment.
Third, in our preferred speciﬁcation we take ﬁrst diﬀerences of the outcome variables in order
to remove any unobserved (time-invariant) diﬀerences in the level of the outcome variables that
may have been present at baseline between the treatment and control group, and that cannot be
accounted for by observable characteristics. Removing unobserved time-invariant characteristics
can also help correct for selection into our selected sample that can generate a bias. In our empirical
analysis, we report estimates using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence for both the ITT (OLS estimates using
the assigned treatment), as well as the IV estimates.39 The ITT speciﬁcation is as follows:
4yijkt = γ0 + βT i +Xik,t−1γ + µijkt (7)
In order to implement the IV approach in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence set-up, we substitute T
for TR in equation (7) and instrument TR with T as in the level regressions. Before turning
to the impact results, Table 10 reports the ﬁrst stage regressions that predict the probability of
a household having reported that they received treatment, deﬁned by the variable TR (which
39The results for the levels speciﬁcation above (speciﬁcation 3) are very similar. As mentioned above, the results
are also robust to: (i) the precise cutoﬀ used in deﬁning the real treatment dummy variable and also (ii) to the use
of perceived or oﬃcial visits as a measurement of treatment. Results available on request.
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equals 1 if the household perceived having received at least 3 visits by a Juntos social worker
by the time of the followup interview as discussed in Section 3) using assigned treatment as the
instrumental variable, for each of the samples analyzed in this paper. The positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the assigned treatment variable indicates that on average this variable positively and
signiﬁcantly predicts having received treatment for all the samples. The F-statistics to test for
weak instruments are also reported and overall these reject the hypothesis that the instrument is
weak in each regression. Results can be seen in Table 10
5.1 Knowledge and use of public programs
We ﬁrst look at the impact of Juntos on the knowledge and usage of key social programs reported
by the household survey respondent. One would expect that this would be one of the ﬁrst areas
in which a social worker would be able to have an inﬂuence, since the baseline knowledge of most
social programs is low and providing knowledge of, and assisting these families in accessing, the
programs they are eligible for seems like an appealing ﬁrst step in helping to lift them out of
poverty.
Table 11 shows the ITT and IV results for the level speciﬁcation described in equation (3) only,
since these variables were only collected at follow-up. As explained above, ideally we would like
to estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach to deal with non-random selection into our panel
sample, which is an issue particulalry for urban households, as discussed in section 4.1. Given
data limiations, we cannot implement this approach for these outcomes and focus on the level
speciﬁcation. However, we can look at ﬁrst diﬀerences for labor market outcomes as shown in the
next section. We can only look at the eﬀect of Juntos on the usage of Familias en Accion, since
the usage of the other programs is close to zero (as shown in Table 7) and there is insuﬃcient
variation across treatment status. Results are consistent with an increase in the knowledge of
Jovenes Rurales Emprendedores, signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and on the knowledge of Programa
para el Desarrollo, signiﬁcant at the 10% level, by displaced households as a consequence of Juntos
(columns 1a and 1b), although we have already seen that the sample of displaced households seems
to suﬀer marginally from imbalances at baseline. Columns 6a and 6b show a positive impact on
the proportion of rural households that use Familias en Accion, that is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level only. An ITT estimate shows that Juntos induced an increase of 7.5 percentage points in
the probability of using Familias en Accion, the IV estimate is higher at 17.3 percentage points.
The overall take-up of Familias en Accion among the poor in both treatment and control rural
households is estimated at 57% in our sample. Overall, given the large number of hypotheses being
tested, and the small number of coeﬃcients statistically signiﬁcant, only at the 5 or 10% level, we
conclude that there were no positive impacts on the knowledge and use of social programs as a
consequence of Juntos.
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5.2 Labor market variables
5.2.1 Displaced sample
Table 12 reports the ITT impact estimates and IV regressions for the ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁcation
described in equation (7) for the main outcomes of interest. Firstly, note that overall the magnitude
of the IV coeﬃcients is larger than the magnitude of the ITT coeﬃcients, as one may expect from
the fact that the ITT coeﬃcients use the variable assigned treatment to estimate eﬀect of treatment,
and that there has been contamination of households assigned to the control group and imperfect
compliance of those assigned to treatment.
Secondly, the IV standard errors are larger, as one may expect. This is also true for the impact
estimates for the other urban and rual populations discussed in the next subsections. The only
statistically signiﬁcant result that holds across both the ITT and the IV speciﬁcation is a positive
impact of the Juntos program on the probability of being active for displaced household heads
(column 1a). This result is robust to using the level speciﬁcation described in equation (3). The
IV results suggest that displaced head of households are 27 percentage points more likely to be
active as a result of the program relative to those households that did not receive treatment. This is
a substantial increase, relative to the baseline level for households in the randomly assigned control
group of 72% (as shown in Table 8). This positive eﬀect on the probability of being active for
household heads is mirrored to some extent in the magnitudes of the estimates for the probability
of being employed (column 2a) and the probability of being self-employed (column 3a), and this
may provide suggestive evidence that the impact on active status may be driven partially by the
group who enter self-employment. However, these coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The remainder of the impact estimates for the displaced sample suggest that there is no impact of
the program on overall earnings, hours worked or hourly pay. Given that the number of hypothesis
being tested using only the IV speciﬁcation in the tables for each of the three population groups
(displaced, urban, rural) is 30, and that the number of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is at maximum three,
it could well be that these results are found by chance. Furthermore, the sample of displaced
households is marginally unbalanced between treatment and control groups (as shown in Table 8).
Taken together, we interpret these results as indicative that the Juntos program did not have any
eﬀect on the labor outcomes of individuals in the displaced sample.
5.2.2 Urban sample
Table 13 shows similar results for the urban sample. From Table 9 we know that individual samples
showed imbalances between assigned treatment and control at baseline, and assigned treatment
was shown to be systematically associated with the probability of being in the sample for the
household level sample (see Table 4). Results should therefore be considered with some caution.
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Only the coeﬃcient on the probability of being active for the sample of women is statistically
signiﬁcant in this Table, and only at the 10 percent level. Overall, there seems to be no consistent
impact of Juntos on the population of individuals living in urban areas.
5.2.3 Rural sample
Table 14 reports the results for the rural sample. Here, there are three out of 30 coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcant in the IV results, both for levels and ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁcations. This again
suggests that the results could be found by chance. Furthermore, the only signiﬁcant results
indicate a negative impact for the sample of women of the Juntos program on the probability of
being employed, mirrored by a decrease in the probability of being self-employed and a decrease in
hourly wages or pay (largely due to a composition eﬀect or a decrease in the number of individuals
that are employed in the ﬁrst place). However, this negative impact on female self-employment,
when combined with the marginally signiﬁcant positive impact on the take-up of Familias en
Accion, is consistent with recent empirical evidence that looks at the impact of conditional cash
transfer programs on labor supply and ﬁnds a small negative impact for rural women. See, for
example, Alzua et al. (2013), who provide evidence of a small negative eﬀect on the probability of
being employed for rural women of the conditional cash transfer program Progresa in Mexico.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper provides an evaluation of the initial phase of the large scale intervention Unidos (i.e.
the pilot program, Juntos) in relation to its impact on access to social programs as well as on
the labor market outcomes of the extreme poor in Colombia. In addition, this paper makes use
of a rich dataset to provide a detailed description of the labor market lives of this traditionally
understudied population.
In terms of the evaluation, we ﬁnd no consistent short-run impact of Juntos on our outcomes of
interest: knowledge of a range of existing social programs; the take-up of the main Colombian
conditional cash transfer program, Familias en Accion; and a range of labor market outcomes,
including the participation rate, employment rate (and type of employment), unemployment rate,
and hours worked, in addition to employment earnings and tenure. The estimated zero eﬀect of
the program on labor market outcomes is not surprising given: (i) the program failed to inﬂuence
participants' knowledge about the available social programs, as well as the use of them, and (ii)
the fact that the availability of several public programs is low for both the treatment and control
groups (see Table 7). One would expect that if the Juntos intervention were to have a substantive
eﬀect, the knowledge and usage of social programs would be one of the ﬁrst important constraints
that would be relaxed.
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As discussed above, we believe the lack of impact is driven in large part by the lightness of the
treatment (i.e. the low number of home visits received by treated households). Given that Unidos,
the nationally rolled out counterpart of Juntos, seems to have very similar features, the evidence
would suggest that it is unlikely to transform the lives of the extreme poor in Colombia. Even if
under Unidos social workers have on average a lower caseload than under the pilot Juntos, this
is still more than double the caseload that social workers have under the similar program Chile
Solidario. Moreover, although Chile Solidario seems to have an eﬀect on the take up of social
programs, it still does not signiﬁcantly transform the lives of the poor in Chile. This could be
rationalized by a lack of direct impact of home visits on the behavior of the poor beyond the take-
up of social programs and by uncertainty around the quality of social programs available through
the welfare system, take-up of which is supposed to be incentivized through programs such as
Unidos and Chile Solidario.
Furthermore, working with these households is particularly diﬃcult given the multitude of con-
straints they face in diﬀerent key areas. This includes a lack of skills and capital, and the presence
of certain psychological traits. Banerjee et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence that shows that
the multifaceted `Graduation' program implemented in six diﬀerent developing countries can gen-
erate progress in reducing extreme poverty, by improving self-employment income and well-being
more generally. This is a multipronged approach that sequentially tackles capital, skill, psycholog-
ical and informational constraints. The authors document that these programs are very costly to
run, though their calculations suggest they are cost-eﬀective in most countries. However, the scale
of these programs is small, covering fewer than 11,000 households in six countries. This compares
to Unidos, which aims to cover around 1.5 million housholds at a national scale using only public
resources. How to optimize and cost-eﬀectively implement programs such as `Graduation' at a
national scale in countries with limited state capacity remains an open question.
In this context, we reiterate the suggestion to policy makers that the Unidos program requires
substantial reforms, and these reforms should be evaluated to understand what (if anything) is
eﬀective, for which population, and the mechanisms through which these impacts occur. Speciﬁc
areas should include: (i) an expansion of the supply of programs and widespread promotion to
boost knowledge of their existence among potential beneﬁciaries; (ii) the assessment of which
programs are most eﬀective in improving the lives of the poor, in order to guide the selection of
programs that should be made available through Unidos, and so improving not only the quantity
but also the quality of social programs; (iii) an increase in the budget allocated to social workers
to ensure they are suitably skilled and have workloads at least similar to other programs of the
same kind (such as Chile Solidario). Importantly, policymakers should strive to guarantee the
quality of these evaluations, by avoiding the contamination of the samples and the dilution of the
treatment. This last point seems particularly crucial in the case of this evaluation, in which a
failure to fully implement the program due to lack of coordination across diﬀerent state agencies
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involved, in addition to insuﬃcient funds, led to a poorly implemented policy in both the pilot
phase evaluated in this paper and in its ﬁnal, scaled-up version.
Given the evidence presented in this paper, it seems unlikely that in its current form Unidos is
having a substantial positive inﬂuence on the livelihoods of the extreme poor in Colombia. One
would hope that by iteratively adjusting and improving the program, and appropriately evaluating
these changes in order to learn what works and what does not, we might converge on a more cost-
eﬀective way to assist this population. Precisely how to do this remains an open question left to
future work.
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Appendix A
The data used in this paper was collected primarily for the evaluation of the Juntos program.
A secondary advantage of this data is that it contains extremely detailed descriptive and behav-
ioral information pertaining to the lives of a very understudied group of individuals - the poorest
members of society. Data collection comprised two waves - a baseline survey, conducted between
November 2009 and March 2010 before the start of treatment, and a followup survey, conducted
between June 2011 and August 2011, after the treatment group began treatment.
The survey included 77 municipalities, chosen to be representative of the country as a whole.
Each municipality was divided into several neighborhoods (clusters), which served as the unit of
randomization. Clusters were randomized into one of four cohort groups. Each of these groups
commenced with treatment at the diﬀerent point in time. The impact analysis in this paper
compares the outcomes of cohort 1, which received treatment ﬁrst and therefore was treated prior
to the second wave of data collection, with cohort 4, which received treatment last and therefore
were designated to be untreated at the second wave of data collection.
Survey Structure
The survey consisted of two parts. The ﬁrst part collected information on the characteristics of
the household, as well as general information on all the members of the household. This part
consisted of several detailed modules relating to diﬀerent aspects of the lives of these individuals.
The module containing questions regarding the knowledge and usage of social programs is of
particular interest to the current analysis in this paper. The second part of the survey collected
detailed health, education and labor market information at an individual level information for all
the relevant members of the household.
In order to satisfy the resource constraints of any project, there is often a tradeoﬀ made between
the size of the sample and the level of detail of the survey. In this project, this tradeoﬀ was
addressed by conducting a shorter survey to a wide sample, while administering a more detailed
survey to a smaller subsample of individuals. Consequently, there were two types of questionnaires
at baseline ('Long' and 'Short') and three types of questionnaires at followup ('Long', 'Medium'
and 'Short'). The Short questionnaire contained core questions that were asked of every household,
while the Medium and Long questionnaires asked individuals more detailed information and were
administered to a subset of households. The allocation of households to each questionnaire type was
done randomly and therefore should not have inﬂuenced the selection of our sample for analysis,
however this is examined in some detail in the main text.
29
Matching individuals across waves
Due to the way in which the data was encoded, individuals in the dataset were not assigned
a personal identiﬁer number that corresponded across the two waves. Therefore, while it was
straight-forward to match households across waves, it was slightly more challenging to match the
individuals within these households across waves. In order to do this, we made use of (i) the names
of these individuals, as well as, (ii) information regarding their date of birth. However, since there
appeared to be a substantial number of inconsistencies in both of these variables,40 we employed
a matching algorithm that used the available information to match individuals who lived in the
same household in both waves and appeared to be the same person, up to a small number of errors
in their recorded data.
The matching algorithm started by matching individuals within a given household with date of
birth and name data that agreed perfectly across waves, and thereafter we matched using a sequence
of criteria that relaxed perfect consistency along each of these dimensions. As every step of this
matching process, we matched only amongst individuals who are in the same household at baseline
and followup, and we matched only amongst the unmatched individuals. Therefore, by starting
with the strictest criterion for matching individuals and moving to more relaxed criteria, we limited
the chance of making an incorrect match as may occur for example if we were to only use the most
relaxed matching criterion for example. Therefore, the guiding principle behind this method for
matching individuals was to strike a balance between matching as many individuals as possible,
while minimizing the likelihood of making an incorrect match.
The way we implemented this matching process was as follows. First, we matched only those
individuals within the same household across waves who have exactly the same name and date of
birth recorded in both waves, with no mistakes. Secondly, amongst the unmatched individuals,
we allowed for small lexicographical deviations and common spelling mistakes, provided the date
of birth is the same. Thirdly, we relaxed perfect consistency along the date of birth dimension,
by allowing for deviations in one of: year, month, or day of birth, provided the individual's
ﬁrst and last name matched between waves. Fourthly, we allowed for small errors along both
dimensions. Fifthly, amongst the remaining unmatched individuals we matched individuals who
had a perfect match for either ﬁrst and last name, or for their date of birth only. Finally, we
manually checked the remaining unmatched individuals within households that were observed in
both waves. After completing this process, we selected 1000 individuals randomly to check for
accuracy of the procedure, this exercise showed the procedure was extremely accurate. In the
end, around 82% individuals members of households appearing in our panel of households were
40For example, there were frequently spelling mistakes in names, or alternatively ﬁrst and second names were
often switched. In addition, by examining the raw data, it was often the case that an individual in baseline and
followup who was clearly the same person, had a deviation in either day, month or year of birth between the two
waves.
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matched.
Variable deﬁnitions
Active Status: the active variable is an indicator variable, deﬁned for individuals over the age of
17, that takes a value of 1 if the person is either (i) currently employed, (ii) has spent the majority
of the last week working, or (iii) has searched for work in the last 4 weeks, and takes a value of 0
otherwise.
Employment: the employed variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the person has
listed at least one job in which she is currently employed, and a 0 otherwise. Notice that since this
variable takes a value of 0 for inactive individuals, this variable reﬂects unconditional employment,
as opposed to employment, conditional on being active. We consider that this way of deﬁning
employment status makes much more sense than deﬁning employed as being employed at any
point in the last year in the context of the evaluation of the Juntos program. Since treatment only
began during the year, it would be a very noisy measure to consider any employment during the
preceding year; even in the followup questionnaire much of this employment would have occurred
prior to treatment.
Self-Employed and Wage Earners: employed workers in our dataset are divided into two categories -
those that work for a wage and those who are self-employed. We therefore deﬁne a dummy variable
'wage earner' that equals 1 for those individuals who state that they are currently employed in a
job in which they earn a wage, and zero otherwise. Correspondingly, the 'self-employed' variable
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all individuals who state that they are either self-employed or
a business owner, and zero otherwise. Both these variables take a value of zero if the individual is
unemployed or inactive.
Formal and Informal Workers: wage earners are classiﬁed as either formal or informal workers on
the basis of whether they reported holding an employment contract. The variable 'wage earner
formal' takes a value of one for workers who report holding a contract and otherwise takes a value
of zero. Similarly the wage earner informal' takes a value of one for workers who report not holding
an employment contract.41'42
Wage and Salary Earnings and Self-Employed Earnings: wage and salary earnings are the monthly
wages or salaries reported by individuals whose primary current job was as a wage earner. Self-
41In this sample the group of self-employed workers would fall into the category of informal workers under most
internationally used informality deﬁnitions, however since this group is quite diﬀerent from the set of informal wage
earners, we examine the two groups separately.
42We also considered two alternative deﬁnitions of informality: ﬁrstly, one that deﬁnes a worker as informal if
she works in a ﬁrm with fewer than 6 employees; and secondly, one that combines the two deﬁnitions, with workers
deﬁned as informal if they don't hold a contract or work in a ﬁrm of fewer than 6 employees. The contract informality
and ﬁrm informality deﬁnitions are highly correlated, and yield similar results. Once we use the combined contract
and ﬁrm size deﬁnition, the proportion of the wage earners deﬁned as informal increases to approximately 90%.
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employment earnings are the monthly earnings net of costs for the self-employed. For those who
are unemployed or inactive we impute zero values. In addition, for those who reported earning a
minimum wage, we did not observe their monthly salary or earnings. We therefore imputed these
values using their monthly hours worked and the national minimum wage for the relevant point in
time.
Hours Worked and Hourly Earnings: for the set of individuals who reported holding a current
job, this variable reﬂects their self-reported number of hours worked in the last week. In order to
calculate the hourly earnings, we multiply the weekly wage by 4.33 to get an approximate number
of hours worked in the month. We then divide the wage and salary earnings individuals who
are wage earners, or self-employed earnings for self-employed individuals, by this monthly hours
worked variable to obtain an hourly earnings.
Tenure: the tenure variable reports the number of months that the individual has spent in her
current job, truncated at the date of the interview. This variable was calculated using the start
date reported for employed individuals' current job. For unemployed or inactive individuals, we
impute a zero value for the tenure variable.
Composite Municipality Level Index: This variable reﬂects a municipality level variable that is a
composite index reﬂecting the quality of public service delivery in each municipality.
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Figure 1: Number of oﬃcial home visits
Figure 2: Number of perceived home visits
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Table 1: Average number of oﬃcial home visits, by treatment group
Table 2: Average number of perceived home visits, by treatment group
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Table 3: Real versus assigned treatment
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Table 4: Impact of assigned treatment on the likelihood of being in the household sample
Table 5: Impact of assigned treatment on the likelihood of being in the individual sample
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Table 6: Basic descriptive statistics of pre and post treatment variables at the household level, by population (unconditional means).
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Table 7: Supply, and self-reported use and knowledge of public programs post treatment at the household level, by population
(unconditional means).
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Table 8: Baseline diﬀerences between treatment and control groups at the household level
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Table 9: Baseline diﬀerences between treatment and control groups at the individual level by
gender, by population
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Table 10: First-stage regressions
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Table 11: Treatment eﬀect of Juntos on knowledge and usage of social programs
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Table 12: Treatment eﬀect of Juntos on participation, employment and earnings, displaced population, ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation
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Table 13: Treatment eﬀect of Juntos on participation, employment and earnings, urban population, ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation
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Table 14: Treatment eﬀect of Juntos on participation, employment and earnings, rural population, ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation
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